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THE EXECUTION OF THE INNOCENT
MICHAEL L. RADELET* AND HUGO ADAM BEDAU**
No matter how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured testimony, mistaken honest
testimony, and human error remain all too real. We have no way of judging how many
innocent persons have been executed, but we can be certain that there were some.
Thurgood Marshall1

I
INTRODUCTION
In February 1997, the (usually conservative) House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association (“ABA”) overwhelmingly adopted a report from its
section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities and went on record as being
formally opposed to America’s current system of capital jurisprudence, calling
2
for an immediate moratorium on executions. The motion was supported by
twenty former presidents of the ABA (some who counted themselves as supporters of the death penalty), and passed in the House of Delegates by a twothirds margin. Among the issues of concern to the ABA were the lack of competent counsel in death penalty cases, restricted access to appellate courts even
when new evidence of innocence is present, and racial disparities in the admini3
stration of capital punishment. In this article, we focus on one of the problems
that gave rise to the ABA resolution: the continuing and regular incidence of
American trial courts sentencing innocent defendants to death.
Elsewhere, we have published accounts of more than four hundred cases
where persons were wrongfully convicted in capital (or potentially capital)
4
cases and described several dozen of these cases in detail. Our discussion in
this article falls into three parts. First, we explore the conceptualization of the
term “innocence.” (Without a precise concept, we have no suitable criterion
for deciding who should and should not be considered innocent despite a crimiCopyright © 1998 by Law and Contemporary Problems
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1. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 367-68 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
2. See American Bar Ass’n, Whatever You Think About the Death Penalty, A System That Will
Take Life Must First Give Justice: A Report from the IR&R Death Penalty Committee, 24 W.T.R. HUM.
RTS. 22 (1997).
3. See id. at 22-24.
4. See MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE oF INNOCENCE (1992) [hereinafter RADELET ET
AL., INNOCENCE]; Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987); Michael L. Radelet et al., Prisoners Released from Death
Rows Since 1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 907 (1996)
[hereinafter Radelet et al., Doubts].
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nal homicide conviction.) Second, we review the kinds of evidence we have relied on previously to support our conclusion that some defendants sentenced to
death and executed were actually innocent. Finally, we consider how government officials and the general public are currently reacting to the issue of possible executions of the innocent and what role this issue plays in contemporary
death penalty debates.
II
CONCEPTUALIZING THE PROBLEM OF INNOCENCE
If we are to study how often innocent people are convicted of murder, sentenced to death, and/or executed, special care must be taken in determining
when a given convicted defendant can and cannot be judged to be innocent.
5
Previous work on this problem touches what is probably only the tip of an iceberg. Undoubtedly, there are many more cases in which innocent persons have
been convicted of homicide that have yet to be thoroughly documented and acknowledged by government officials, much less publicized in a way that will allow those who care to learn lessons from them.
In our initial research on this problem, we included in our inventory of exonerated defendants only those who were totally uninvolved in the capital offense of which they were convicted, or who were convicted of a capital crime
that never occurred (for example, consensual sexual relations tried in court as
6
capital rape), or a criminal homicide in which the victim was later discovered
7
alive, which happened, most recently, to our knowledge, in 1974 in California.
Such narrow inclusion criteria yield an extremely conservative set of cases.
Almost any other plausible conceptualization of innocence would yield a much
larger set.
Of course, including only cases where government officials admitted error
would result in an even more conservative estimate. To be sure, in some ninety
percent of the cases described in our previous publications, there is some acknowledgement by public officials in one or more branches of government that
the trial court’s judgment of guilt was incorrect. But our investigations failed to
disclose a single case in the twentieth century where a government official in
this country admitted that an execution carried out under his authority, or to
8
his knowledge in his jurisdiction, took the life of an innocent defendant. By it5. See, e.g., C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION
PUBLIC POLICY (1996); RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4; Bedau & Radelet, supra
note 4; Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4.
6. For example, see the case of William Henry Anderson, in RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 282. In a five-month period in 1945 in Ft. Lauderdale, Anderson, who was black, was
arrested for rape, tried, found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed. Much evidence indicates that
the relationship between Anderson and the “victim,” who was white, was consensual.
7. See RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 269-70.
8. As far as we know, the last execution that was later officially acknowledged to have been in
error occurred in Illinois in 1887, when four Haymarket defendants were hanged in Illinois. A fifth
defendant took his own life on the eve of the scheduled executions. Six years later, Governor John
Altgeld pardoned the three surviving codefendants because all eight “had been wrongfully convicted
AND
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self, however, that is hardly reason to believe that innocent defendants have
not been executed.
Although the conceptualization of innocence could be broadened in several
different ways from the conservative definition we have used in our research,
we have made no attempt to do so or to investigate the new types of cases that
would, as a result, need to be included in our inventory. The task is simply
overwhelming. However, we can cite examples of cases that illustrate these alternative ways to broaden the conceptualizations of innocence.
A. Acquittal After Appellate Reversal
One way to broaden the definition is to include all those cases in which the
case against the defendant was ultimately dismissed or the defendant was acquitted at retrial. To be sure, in our research, we treat a dismissal of charges
after reversal of a defendant’s conviction, or a verdict of acquittal at retrial, as
evidence of innocence, but we do not regard it as either a necessary or suffi9
cient condition of innocence. Prosecutors sometimes fail to retry the defendant after a reversal not because of doubt about the accused’s guilt, much less
because of belief that the defendant is innocent or that the defendant is not
guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but for reasons wholly unrelated to guilt or
innocence (for example, the prosecution’s chief witnesses may have died or disappeared). Such cases could be included among those we count as miscarriages
of justice, on the rationale that, if a trial court conviction is to be treated as
conclusive evidence of (legal) guilt, then by parity of reasoning nolle prosequi
after a reversal could reasonably be treated as evidence of (legal) innocence.
Other reasonable observers have included such cases, notably the authors of a
1993 House Subcommittee Staff Report on innocence and the death penalty.
They collapse the distinction between being acquitted of charges and being innocent, arguing that “[u]nder the law, there is no distinction between the definitely innocent and those found innocent [that is, acquitted] after a trial but
10
about whom there may remain a lingering doubt.”
Other ways to expand the concept of innocence would permit us to include
cases where a capital crime was indeed committed but by accident, in self11
defense, or by an offender who is certifiably mentally ill. Yet another class of
cases consists of defendants who are guilty of criminal homicide, but not of

and were innocent of the crime. . . .” PAUL AVRICH, THE HAYMARKET TRAGEDY 423 (1984). On
August 21, 1993, Governor Walter D. Miller formally apologized for the wrongful hanging of Thomas
Egan in 1882. See generally C. JOHN EGAN, JR., DROP HIM TIL HE DIES (1994).
9. “Defendants are acquitted for many reasons, the least likely being innocence.” Louis B.
Schwartz, “Innocence”—A Dialogue with Professor Sundby, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 153, 154 (1989).
10. 1 STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CIV. AND CONST. RIGHTS, OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., REPORT ON INNOCENCE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: ASSESSING THE
DANGER OF MISTAKEN EXECUTIONS 13 (Subcomm. Print 1993).
11. Our most recent work extends those parameters slightly by including three cases in which the
defendant, initially sentenced to death, was later able to show that the homicide was committed in selfdefense. See Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4, at 912.

RADELET.FMT.DOC

108

05/18/99 3:42 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 61: No. 4

first-degree murder, and who—for any of several reasons—are erroneously
convicted of capital murder nevertheless.
B. Accidental Killings
There are many cases in which a defendant, after being convicted of homicide and even sentenced to death, wins a retrial and is acquitted after persuading the jury that the homicide was accidental. Legally, such a defendant is innocent of murder and always was; the original conviction of criminal homicide
was a miscarriage of justice.
In this context, consider the Florida case of Clifford Hallman, sentenced to
death for killing a waitress in a barroom brawl in Tampa in 1973. Hallman’s
death sentence was eventually commuted to life imprisonment after it was
shown that with proper medical care, the victim would not have died (indeed,
the victim’s family successfully sued Tampa General Hospital for malpractice).
Hallman unquestionably cut the victim during the brawl, but almost certainly
did not intend for her to die. Despite being guilty only of accidentally causing
12
death, he remains imprisoned a quarter of a century later.
C. Homicides in Self-Defense
Depending on what theory of legal excuse and legal justification one accepts, homicide in self-defense is either excusable or justifiable and thus not
criminal. Yet, persons have been sentenced to death for killing others in selfdefense. In 1979 in California, Patrick “Hooty” Croy was sentenced to death
for killing a police officer, but at retrial in 1990 he was acquitted when he was
13
able to show his jury that the killing had been done in self-defense. In South
Carolina in 1979, Michael Linder was sentenced to death for killing a highway
patrol officer, but he was acquitted two years later at retrial when ballistics evi14
dence supported Linder’s self-defense claims.
D. Homicide by the Mentally Ill
In another class of cases, the defendant does cause the death of another
person but lacks the requisite mens rea to be held responsible for the crime.
Nevertheless, the trial court convicts the defendant and sentences him to death.
Why? Because of the incompetence of his attorney, or the absence or incompetence of expert psychiatric witnesses, or the jury’s refusal to believe defense
15
experts, or for other reasons. The result in any case is the same: Innocent de-

12. See Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in Post-Furman Capital
Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 309 (1993).
13. See Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4, at 933-34.
14. See id. at 948.
15. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994) [hereinafter Bright 1994]; Stephen B. Bright, In
Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons
Facing the Death Penalty, 57 MO. L. REV. 849 (1992) [hereinafter Bright 1992]; Stephen B. Bright, The
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fendants (that is, defendants not properly held responsible for their acts) are
convicted and sometimes sentenced to death.
A classic example of this type of error involves Erwin Charles Simants, sen16
tenced to death in 1976 for killing six members of a Nebraska family. At re17
trial in 1979, he was found not guilty by reason of insanity. Not so lucky was
Varnall Weeks. On May 13, 1995, readers of The New York Times learned that
“Varnall Weeks, a convicted killer described by psychiatric experts as a paranoid schizophrenic who believed he would come back to life as a giant flying
tortoise that would rule the world, was put to death . . . in Alabama’s electric
18
chair.” At trial, Weeks’s inexperienced court-appointed attorney never raised
the issue of the defendant’s insanity. As the Times editorialized a few days before the execution, “if Alabama is allowed to take this sorry life, it will . . . expose just how barbaric and bloodthirsty this nation has become in its attempt to
19
see justice done.” No one knows how many mentally ill convicts there are on
America’s death rows who do not deserve to be punished, but the number is
20
unquestionably significant.
These three categories of cases are familiar and have been discussed before
by others, notably Charles Black; all illustrate what he rightly called the
“caprice and mistake” in the criminal justice system where the death penalty is
21
used. But three other categories of innocence that have received less recognition also deserve attention.
E. Noncapital Murderers
Not all convicted murderers are candidates for the executioner. Death
penalty abolitionists and retentionists alike agree that capital punishment is not
supposed to apply to all murderers; it is to be applied only to the worst among
the bad. David Baldus and his colleagues have estimated that “death-eligible”
murder cases number at present around 2,000-5,000, or ten to twenty-five per22
cent of all murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in the nation. Data on
death sentencing practices in Florida suggest the number of death-eligible defendants may be even smaller; in any case, the system transforms only a few of
these defendants into death row prisoners. In Florida, there are about a thouPolitics of Crime and the Death Penalty: Not “Soft on Crime,” but Hard on the Bill of Rights, 39 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 479 (1995) [hereinafter Bright 1995].
16. See Fred W. Friendly, A Crime and Its Aftershock, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 21, 1976, at 16.
17. See Man Guilty of Oklahoma Murders; Defendant in Nebraska Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
1979, at 16.
18. Rick Bragg, A Killer Racked by Delusions Dies in Alabama’s Electric Chair, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 1995, at A7.
19. Andrew L. Shapiro, An Insane Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A29.
20. See KENT S. MILLER & MICHAEL L. RADELET, EXECUTING THE MENTALLY ILL (1993);
Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Psychiatric, Neurological, and Psychoeducational Characteristics of 15
Death Row Inmates in the United States, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 838 (1986).
21. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND
MISTAKE 17-18 (2d ed. 1981).
22. See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 22 & n.* (1990).
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sand homicides per year. Yet, despite the popularity of the death penalty, only
about three dozen defendants, 3.6%, are actually convicted of first-degree
23
murder and sentenced to death. If we arrange Florida’s thousand murders per
year on a scale from the most aggravated (perhaps a multiple rape-murder) to
the least aggravated (perhaps a mercy killing), we can define “capital murder”
(based on the verdicts and sentences of the trial courts themselves) as the
crimes committed by the worst three or four percent.
However, some of those three to four percent are not sentenced to death,
while some of the others are. Ted Bundy, for example, qualifies in the judgment of most people as one of the nation’s worst murderers. Yet he was of24
fered a plea bargain in both of his Florida murder trials. Had he wished to do
so, he could have escaped a death sentence by pleading guilty to noncapital
murder. His case is not unique. It is common for defendants accused of some
of the worst murders to escape the death penalty through plea bargaining. Often the prosecution has little choice: either accept a plea bargain or risk not getting a conviction because of lack of convincing evidence. As the O.J. Simpson
case showed, prosecutors may quickly decide not to seek the death penalty—
even for those they believe are multiple murderers—when they learn the de25
fendant is able to employ top-notch attorneys.
Other defendants are not so lucky. If measured by statutory “aggravating”
circumstances, their crimes do not place them among Florida’s worst three to
four percent, yet they end up on death row nonetheless. Many examples could
be cited here, but consider only the case of Ernest Dobbert, executed in Florida
on September 7, 1984. He had been convicted of killing his nine-year-old
daughter. His Jacksonville jury, obviously troubled, recommended life imprisonment by a vote of ten to two; Florida’s unusual death sentencing law allows
the trial judge to reject the jury’s recommendation, and the judge sentenced
Dobbert to death. The key witness at trail was Dobbert’s thirteen-year-old son,
26
who testified that he saw his father kick his daughter. In a dissent from the
Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari written just hours before Dobbert’s execution, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that while there was no question that
Dobbert abused his children, there was substantial doubt about his premeditation, necessary to sustain his conviction of first-degree murder. “That may well
make Dobbert guilty of second-degree murder in Florida, but it cannot make
him guilty of first-degree murder there. Nor can it subject him to the death
27
penalty in that state.” If Justice Marshall’s assessment was correct, then Dob-

23. See Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Choosing Those Who Will Die: Race and the Death
Penalty in Florida, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1, 20 (1991).
24. See Michael Mello, On Metaphors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of
Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 887, 900 (1990-91).
25. See Kenneth B. Noble, Prosecutor in Simpson Case Won’t Seek Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1994, at A6.
26. He later recanted and said his sister had actually died from choking on food.
27. Dobbert v. Wainwright, 468 U.S. 1231, 1246 (1984).

RADELET.FMT.DOC

Page 105: Autumn 1998]

05/18/99 3:42 PM

EXECUTION OF THE INNOCENT

111

bert was not guilty of a capital offense, and—in this qualified sense—Florida
executed an innocent man.
Although defendants like Dobbert may be unquestionably guilty of some
form of criminal homicide, they are arguably not guilty of capital murder. They
do not belong among the death-eligible defendants. We rarely think about this
category when discussing innocence and the death penalty, but it is relevant
and extremely important. The problem has been with us for at least two centuries, ever since the invention of the distinction between first-degree (capital)
murder and second-degree (noncapital) murder and the inclusion of felony
murder (in other words, any homicide committed in the course of committing a
felony, such as rape or robbery) within first-degree murder. Proper administration of the death penalty requires us to draw careful lines in several different
dimensions simultaneously, but a substantial amount of evidence shows we are
doing a poor job distinguishing between those who do and those who do not
deserve—in a strict legal sense—to be found guilty of capital murder and sen28
tenced to death.
Some of those who are guilty of criminal homicide but factually innocent of
capital murder end up on death row because of a politically ambitious prosecutor, a lazy or angry jury, incompetent or over-worked defense counsel, or just
29
bad luck. Others are on death row not out of arbitrariness, but because of sys30
31
tematic bias and discrimination. In Florida and in several other states, taking
into account all the relevant facts, those who kill whites are between three and
32
four times more likely to end up on death row as are those who kill blacks. In
short, the race of the victim is a strong predictor of which defendants end up on
death row, and explains why some who are innocent of capital murder are
nonetheless sentenced to death.
Sentencing defendants to death who are innocent of capital murder—or innocent of any homicide—is especially risky in states where the trial judge has
the authority to disregard the jury’s sentence recommendation, as in Alabama,
Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. After interviewing fifty-four jurors from a
dozen Florida capital juries (including the jury that judged Ernest Dobbert),

28. See GEN. GOV’T DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES (Feb. 26, 1990); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL U.S.A, THE MACHINERY OF DEATH: A SHOCKING INDICTMENT OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1995); BALDUS ET AL., supra note 22; HUGO ADAM BEDAU,
THE CASE AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY 11-16 (1997); INTERNATIONAL COMMISION OF JURISTS,
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF A MISSION (1996);
David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and
Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 385 (James R. Acker et al. eds.,
1998); Bright 1994, supra note 15.
29. See generally Bright 1995, supra note 15; Bright 1994, supra note 15; Bright 1992, supra note
15.
30. See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 23, at 21.
31. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 22; SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND
DISCRMINIATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL SENTENCING (1989).
32. See Radelet & Pierce, supra note 23, at 28.
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William Geimer and Jonathan Amsterdam concluded, “The existence of some
degree of doubt about the guilt of the accused was the most often recurring ex33
planatory factor in the life [imprisonment] recommendation cases studied.”
Clearly, even when jurors believe that certain defendants are “guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt,” lingering doubts often remain about whether the defendant
is guilty of a capital crime, and those doubts understandably make the jurors
reluctant to recommend the extreme penalty.
F. Innocent Victims in the Death Row Inmate’s Family
No discussion of innocence and the death penalty can be complete without
considering how the death penalty affects the inmate’s family.
Consider for a moment why some Americans want the death penalty rather
than life imprisonment. They argue that the inmate does not suffer enough if
punished only by life imprisonment. What is it about the death penalty that
makes the inmate suffer more than if he had been sentenced instead to a long
term of imprisonment? In many cases, the primary pain felt by men facing execution is seeing what their plight and their anticipated execution does to their
families. Life in prison is a miserable life; the inmate knows that even if he
were to leave death row via commutation of his sentence, he would be resentenced to life without possibility of parole and would die in prison. Given the
widespread availability of life-without-parole sentences, almost all of those sentenced to death, absent the death penalty, will still die in prison. Being executed would end the pain of imprisonment sooner rather than later.
But the pain felt by the inmate anticipating execution is often overshadowed by the pain that innocent family members experience in anticipating the
death of their loved one. Their pain arises out of their helplessness, the scorn
directed at them, and what they endure immediately prior to, during, and after
34
the execution itself. Families of death row inmates are often indigent and almost always powerless to resist public and political outcries aimed at their incarcerated loved one. While the inmate’s suffering is terminated at the instant
of death, that of the family members goes on, from the moment they learn the
death sentence has been carried out through the years of living with the memories and second-guesses. Arguably, the only thing worse than being executed is
to see a member of your family executed.
Sentimental though this may seem to some, we make this point in the context of discussing the execution of the innocent for the following reason. Today, the main rationale generally given for retaining the death penalty is retri-

33. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors
in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 28 (1987-88).
34. See Michael L. Radelet et al., Families, Prisons, and Men with Death Sentences: The Human
Impact of Structured Uncertainty, 4 J. FAM. ISSUES 593 (1983); Margaret Vandiver, The Impact of the
Death Penalty on the Families of Homicide Victims and of Condemned Prisoners, in AMERICA’S
EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 28, at 477.
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35

bution. Retribution gives us the simplest and most direct argument for the
death penalty: Execute murderers because they deserve it. However, the
death penalty inflicts its harm not with a laser but with a shotgun, injuring the
guilty and the innocent alike. In ways very unlike prison sentences, the death
penalty creates an ever-widening circle of victims. And many of those caught
in the circle as it widens do not deserve it. Obviously, families of homicide victims do not deserve their pain either, but the discussion about the death penalty
is foremost a discussion of how much misery society should deliberately inflict
in the future, not about the misery that has already been inflicted in the past
(and is therefore unretractable) by the offender.
III
HAVE INNOCENT DEFENDANTS REALLY BEEN EXECUTED?
In 1985, when we released the first draft of our research on erroneous con36
victions in capital cases, the reaction by the Reagan Administration took us by
surprise. Then-Attorney General Edwin Meese III, who in California in 1967
(with then-Governor Ronald Reagan) presided over the next to last pre37
38
Furman execution in America, ordered the Justice Department to prepare
39
an immediate response. We had evidently hit a sore spot in the Administration’s support of the death penalty; neither before nor since has the Attorney
General’s office taken such an interest in academic research on the death pen40
alty. The government’s response was not, as one might naïvely have hoped, to

35. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans’ Views on
the Death Penalty, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994), reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA:
CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 90, 95-98 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997).
36. See David Margolick, 25 Wrongfully Executed in U.S., Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1985,
at A19.
37. In the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, the Supreme Court (in effect) invalidated
all existing death penalty statutes in the United States. Thereafter, states drew up new capital laws
and procedures, making Furman the demarcation of the “modern” era of the death penalty in the
United States.
38. See Carl J. Seneker, Governor Reagan and Executive Clemency, 55 CAL. L. REV. 412 (1967).
39. See Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the BedauRadelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988); see also Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The
Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988).
40. Two other similar distortions of academic scholarship on the death penalty deserve mention.
In 1975, when Solicitor General Robert Bork submitted an amicus brief in Fowler v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 904 (1976), he asserted that all research that concluded the death penalty had no deterrent
effect was severely flawed, and that the research of Isaac Ehrlich, which found that each execution deterred seven murders, provided “a reliable basis for judging whether the death penalty has a deterrent
effect.” David C. Baldus & James W.L. Cole, A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac
Ehrlich on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975). The inadequacies and
inconclusiveness of Ehrlich’s research have been extensively demonstrated. See, e.g., William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 135, 141-43; Ruth D. Peterson & William C.
Bailey, Is Capital Punishment an Effective Deterrent for Murder? An Examination of Social Science
Research, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 28, at 157, 165-66. In
1972, Henry Peterson, an assistant attorney general in the Nixon Administration, testified before Congress to the effect that a “study” by the ABA showed that the death penalty was an effective deterrent.
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confirm or disconfirm our findings by throwing its resources behind a more
comprehensive study of the problem. We carried out our initial research over
four years on a budget of $9,000; it is anyone’s guess what could have been discovered if the vast resources of the Justice Department had been available for
more extensive research into the 350 cases we studied, much less any of the
thousands of cases still waiting to be reexamined. Instead, the Attorney General’s Office designed its response solely to discredit our work and by implication to insulate the death penalty from the charge that even in our society, with
all the legal protections afforded the accused or convicted or sentenced capital
defendant, there is still an undeniable risk of executing the innocent. As events
would prove, the government’s hostile reaction to our work was far different
41
from that of other informed observers.
The Justice Department’s response focused on ten of the twenty-three cases
about which we declared our belief that the executed defendant was innocent.
Our critics did little more than rehash the case for the prosecution, because
they thought, or wanted their readers to believe, that we had denied or forgotten that these defendants had been found guilty in court “beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Our judgment to the contrary was explained as the result of our careless methodology and excessive anti-death penalty zeal. As recently as 1994,
42
the conservative magazine National Review recycled the views of our critics.
Some of the nation’s leading judges have given our work more positive attention. For example, Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun used our research to support (in part) his decision to abandon any further tinkering with
“the machinery of death,” as he called it, in the futile hope to make the admini43
stration of the death penalty in our society fair and efficient. And, in 1998, the
Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court, Gerald Kogan, pointed to our
work as one reason why he had decided to urge Florida lawmakers to abandon
44
the death penalty.
We should mention in passing that despite not having demonstrated any
lack of integrity or reliability in our research, the Justice Department’s critique
of that work has been very effective. The critique is frequently cited by those
who support executions, though they give no evidence of having actually read
the critique, much less of having read our law review article, our reply to our
critics, or our book. Perhaps this is another example of the complacency that
surrounds the public’s attitude toward the death penalty and issues of fact on
which that attitude ought to depend.
No such ABA study existed. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Nixon Administration and the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 557 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Wendy Kaminer, The Wrong Men, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1992, at 147; Lawrence C. Marshall, Book Review, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 261 (1994).
42. See Stephen J. Markman, Innocents on Death Row?, NAT’L REV., Sept. 12, 1994, at 72.
43. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari
to Callins v. Collins, 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993)).
44. See Jenny Staletovich, Justice Raising Voice to Bury Death Penalty, PALM BEACH POST, Jan.
19, 1998, at A1, A8. Kogan is the former chief of the capital crimes unit for the Dade County State
Attorney’s Office.
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Again and again, our critics point out that no responsible official in any of
the nation’s capital jurisdictions has ever admitted to executing an innocent
person in this century, a point we were the first to make on the basis of our ex45
tensive research into the question. Obviously, the government’s failure or refusal to acknowledge that an innocent defendant has been executed is hardly
evidence that none has been executed.
Getting the state to concede that it has convicted (let alone executed) an
innocent defendant is clearly no easy matter. Once an innocent person is convicted, it is almost impossible to get that conviction reversed on grounds of the
46
accused’s innocence. Even when prisoners do get released, usually the prosecutor or some other state official will continue to insist publicly that they really
are guilty. The Jacobs-Tafero case powerfully and painfully illustrates this
point.
In May 1990, Jesse Tafero was executed in Florida. His case gained notoriety because the electric chair malfunctioned and his head caught on fire before
47
he died. Two years later, Jesse’s co-defendant, Sonia Jacobs, who had been
convicted and sentenced to death on exactly the same evidence that sent Tafero
to his death, was released after a U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that her
conviction was based on prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence and
48
perjury by a prosecution witness (who was the real killer). Jacobs now lives in
49
Los Angeles, and in early 1996, a television movie of her case was aired. But
Tafero is dead. Had he been alive, the evidence that led to Jacobs’s release
would have led to his release, too.
Did Jacobs’s vindication and release cause any Florida official to admit the
error in convicting Tafero, much less to apologize on behalf of the state, or
even to express second thoughts about Tafero’s execution? No. To be sure, a
50
few newspaper articles pointed out the error, but no politician, prosecutor,
judge, or ex-juror involved in the case has so far made any public comment on
Tafero’s fate in light of Jacobs’s vindication. Tafero’s mother, living impoverished in Pennsylvania, does not have the resources to mount a campaign to
clear her son’s name. His attorneys have long since moved on to other cases.
So, given that we cannot point to admission of erroneous executions by
government officials involved in the cases we have studied, on what grounds
can we confidently infer that innocent defendants have been executed? Apart
45. “[W]e have found no instance in which the government has officially acknowledged that an
execution carried out under lawful authority was in error.” Bedau & Radelet, supra note 4, at 25.
46. In an extremely important article, Professor Samuel Gross argued that both the probability of
erroneous conviction and the odds of erroneous convictions being ignored by appellate courts and
clemency officials are higher in capital than in noncapital cases. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of
Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996).
47. See Ellen McGarrahan, 3 Jolts Used to Execute Killer, MIAMI HERALD, May 5, 1990, at A1.
48. See Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1992).
49. The made-for-television show was entitled In the Blink of an Eye, and aired in the spring of
1996.
50. See, e.g., Cynthia Barnett, New Evidence Might Have Spared Killer, GAINESVILLE SUN (Fla.),
Nov. 21, 1992, at A1.
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from rare cases like Tafero-Jacobs (where one codefendant is executed before
the other codefendant is exonerated), there are at least three kinds of evidence
that we believe ought to convince any reasonable person that innocent defendants have been executed: close calls, calculation of the odds, and the role of
51
“Lady Luck.”
A. Close Calls
Between 1972 and the end of 1996, sixty-eight death row inmates in the na52
tion were released because of doubts about their guilt. These releases do not
prove that the system works, as some defenders of the death penalty would argue. Representative Bill McCollum, for example, one of our executioners’ best
friends in Congress, was “encouraged” by the findings, claiming that the sixty53
eight errors in twenty-five years “shows that the system is working quite well.”
Contrary to such political spin, however, our research indicates that if “the system worked,” the defendants would be dead. In virtually all of these cases, the
defendants were released only after an expensive and exhausting uphill struggle, unsupported by public funds or public officials, and almost always fiercely
resisted by the prosecution and ignored by those with the power to commute a
death sentence.
Some of these prisoners, now free, came within a few days of being executed. Randall Adams, sentenced to death in Texas in 1977 and exonerated in
54
1989, came to within one week of his execution. Andrew Mitchell, sentenced
to death in Texas in 1981, came within five days of death by lethal injection be55
fore being vindicated in 1993. Two half-brothers in Florida, William Jent and
Ernest Miller, came within sixteen hours of being executed before they were
56
57
released from prison in 1988. More such cases have been cited elsewhere.
Today, there are more than three thousand prisoners on America’s death
58
rows. As things stand, it would be preposterous to believe that all the innocent death row defendants have been identified and exonerated. If the history
of the last twenty years is any guide to the future, an average of three death row
inmates per year will continue to be vindicated and released. How many
51. For an excellent discussion of why American criminal procedures do not protect the innocent
from erroneous conviction, see Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do
We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1358-93 (1997).
52. Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4. A later report based on our research was issued by the
Death Penalty Information Center. See DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, INNOCENCE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY: THE INCREASING DANGER OF EXECUTING THE INNOCENT (1997). This report received extensive national and international publicity. See, e.g., Terry Carter, Numbers Tell the
Story, 83 A.B.A. J. 20 (Oct. 1997).
53. See Carter, supra note 52, at 20.
54. See RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 67-69.
55. See Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4, at 950-51.
56. See RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 318.
57. For two dozen cases in which innocent prisoners came to within 72 hours of executions, see id.
at 276; Bedau & Radelet, supra note 4, at 72.
58. On July 1, 1998, the exact number of prisoners on America’s death rows stood at 3,474. See
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH ROW, U.S.A., Summer 1998, at 1.
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equally innocent death row inmates will be unsuccessful in obtaining relief is
impossible to know, but the number most certainly is not zero.
B. Calculation of the Odds
Assume we execute two death row inmates, each of whom we believe is
guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt” on the evidence. Let belief in guilt
“beyond a reasonable doubt” mean that we are ninety percent confident of
guilt, and that our belief in both these cases is correct. Nevertheless we are not
(and rarely could be) 100% certain, and so, on these assumptions, we are implicitly accepting a ten percent error rate even when we are ninety percent confident. However, because the odds of error are multiplicative, the probability
that any two death row prisoners chosen at random are guilty is not ninety percent (0.9), but only eighty-one percent (0.9 x 0.9). Thus, the probability that all
3,000 death row inmates today are guilty, even if we are ninety percent confident of guilt in each case, is minuscule.
To put this another way, if we executed 100 inmates and we were ninetyfive percent certain of guilt in each case, we would be implicitly accepting a five
percent error rate; in being willing to execute all 100, we are in effect willing to
execute five out of the hundred who might be innocent (even though, of course,
we do not know which five are innocent, or whether more or any are). If our
perceptions on the odds of error are accurate reflections of the real occurrences
of error, the number of innocent persons legally executed is quite high—and
much higher than our admittedly selective and incomplete research into identifiable cases suggests.
C. The Role of “Lady Luck”
In the heat of their attack on our claim that some two dozen of the several
hundred cases we studied involved the execution of the innocent, the Justice
Department simply ignored the vast majority of cases where we claim an inno59
cent person was convicted of a capital offense but was not executed. In effect,
their silence tacitly concedes that our judgment is correct in more than ninety
percent of all the cases and wrong in fewer than ten percent. Why these critics
think that small percent matters they have yet to explain. What they conveniently overlook are scores of cases in which they do not—and could not reasonably—dispute our claims, namely, that innocent persons have been convicted and sentenced to death, and that innocent prisoners who were not
executed would have been, or might have been, executed except for extraordinary good fortune.
Consider some of the ways good fortune smiled on the innocent death row
prisoner. Some of the cases we cite involve a defendant whose release was
owing to the timely discovery of a hitherto unknown eyewitness (for example,

59. See generally Markman & Cassell, supra note 39.
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60

the case of Jerry Banks ). What if that witness had not stepped forward? In
other cases we cite, the true culprit confessed in time to save the innocent pris61
oner (for example, the case of James Foster ). What if the true culprit had
kept silent about his involvement? In still other cases, vindication depended on
a dedicated journalist who took up the cause and established that the convicted
defendant is really innocent (for example, the case of Freddie Pitts and Wilbert
62
Lee ). What if no journalist had developed a timely interest in the case? In
1993, Kirk Bloodsworth was freed from death row in Maryland when technology not widely available at the time of his trial (DNA testing) proved his inno63
cence. What if this technology had not been developed for another decade, or
semen on the body of the victim had not been preserved, or the victim had not
been raped as well as murdered? Under any of these conditions, Bloodsworth
would not have been exonerated.
In one way or another, virtually every case in which death row inmates are
able to prove their innocence is a story of exceptional luck. Only when we realize how lucky the exonerated death row defendants have been can we realize
how easy it is for fatal mistakes to go undetected. The more such cases are discovered the greater the likelihood there are other cases so far undetected—and
that some of these cases involve the execution of the innocent. Just because
boats filled with illegal drugs are regularly intercepted by the police near our
shores, it does not follow that all boats carrying such drugs have been intercepted.
IV
ACTUAL AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
The fact that innocent persons (in one or another sense of “innocence”) are
executed seems to have had little if any real impact on opinion toward the
death penalty. Four deaf audiences can be identified: the appellate courts,
clemency boards, legislatures, and the general public.
A. Appellate Courts
The Supreme Court has in effect said that appellate courts need not listen
to postconviction evidence of a defendant’s innocence, unless the circumstances
are truly exceptional, as when the inmate has a videotape supporting his alibi
that he was not at the scene of the murder. The Court issued a ruling of this
64
very sort in 1995 in the case of Lloyd Schlup. While incarcerated at the Missouri State Penitentiary, Schlup was accused of, and eventually sentenced to
death for, the murder of a fellow inmate. Scheduled to be executed in 1993, he
came to within nine hours of his death before Governor Mel Carnahan granted
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

See RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 176-88.
See id. at 23-39.
See id. at 326.
See Radelet et al., Doubts, supra note 4, at 926-27.
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
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a stay and appointed a panel to reinvestigate the case. In addition to the
videotape, Schlup had affidavits from twenty other prisoners and a former
66
guard stating that he was not the killer. Schlup’s demand for a full hearing on
his innocence prevailed in the Supreme Court by the narrowest of margins—
67
one vote. In this case, the Court continued its unremitting effort to reduce access to appellate review via federal habeas corpus by raising the threshold for
relief. It ruled that before an inmate could present evidence of his innocence in
federal courts in search of a hearing to reopen the case, he must show that “a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
68
actually innocent.” By “probably,” the Court seems to have meant “more
likely than not.” Prior to Schlup, the defendant seeking habeas corpus relief in
federal courts had to show by “clear and convincing evidence” that “no reasonable juror would have found him guilty except for a constitutional error at his
trial.” Although this was a victory for Schlup (a victory that, thanks to Congress, other inmates will not be able to secure; see our discussion below), it
demonstrates how reluctant the appellate courts are to hear evidence of innocence. Had there been no videotapes to present to the courts, Schlup would
have been executed.
B. Clemency Boards
Government officials with the power to commute death sentences to terms
of imprisonment have not been receptive to arguments of the condemned de69
fendant’s innocence.
In the twenty year period from 1973 to 1992, only
twenty-nine death sentences were commuted to prison terms for humanitarian
70
reasons by executive clemency; doubt about the defendant’s guilt was a factor
71
in nine of these cases. Only one of these commutations came from Texas or
California, states with the largest death row populations; in Florida, the only
other state with more than three hundred prisoners on death row, there has not

65. See id. at 313 n.27.
66. See Don Terry, Despite New Evidence, A Prisoner Faces Death, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at
A12.
67. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 298.
68. Id.
69. For a recent discussion of executive clemency in capital cases, see Daniel T. Kobil, The
Evolving Role of Clemency in Capital Cases, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 28, at 531.
70. See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 12, at 297-99; cf. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255, 263 (1990-91). These two
sources cite different commutation totals for the years in question because Bedau relied upon adjusted
Bureau of Justice Statistics (which include some appellate court-ordered resentencing), whereas
Radelet and Zsembik’s more accurate figures were derived from examining records of all death sentences imposed in the United States since 1972 (primarily in the files of the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund).
71. See Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 12, at 300. Since this research was published, four more
death row inmates have had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment because of doubts about
guilt: Earl Washington, Jr. (Virginia, Jan. 15, 1994), Don Paradis (Idaho, May 24, 1996), Joseph Payne
(Virginia, Nov. 7, 1996), and Henry Lee Lucas (Texas, June 26, 1998).
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been a commutation of a death sentence in more than a dozen years. A defendant’s possible innocence has begun to seem almost like an argument
against clemency: No one, least of all members of clemency boards, wants to
embarrass the state officials who worked to get the prisoner convicted, sentenced, and executed.
C. Legislatures
Worry that the innocent might be executed has not persuaded state legislatures to create tighter standards for death sentencing, much less to repeal the
73
death penalty. In 1994, Kansas reenacted the death penalty; New York’s leg74
islature did so in 1995, and Massachusetts came within one vote of following
75
suit in 1997, despite evidence of wrongful capital convictions in each of these
76
states, evidence virtually placed in the hands of every member of these state
legislatures prior to their votes. In New York, extensive protections demanded
77
by concerned legislators were built into the new death penalty law, with what
effect remains to be seen. But the history of wrongful convictions in capital
cases did not in the end persuade the majority to vote against reenacting the
death penalty. Nor is there any reason to believe that if Governor Pataki in
78
New York (elected in part for his vigorous pro-death penalty stance ) were
confronted with a plea for clemency from a death row prisoner, he would follow the lead of his predecessors, Alfred E. Smith (1923-28) and Herbert H.
Lehman (1933-42). When Smith and Lehman served as New York’s governors,
death sentences were routinely commuted every time one or more Court of
79
Appeals judges dissented from a ruling that affirmed a conviction.
In recent years, Congress, like the courts, has made it easier to execute the
innocent. In 1995, federal funding for attorneys serving indigent death row inmates was severely cut, resulting in the closure of “Resource Centers” in
80
twenty states that provided legal services for condemned inmates. Congress
has also restricted the ability of federal courts to hear claims of innocence.
Several new barriers to obtaining habeas corpus relief are contained in the
72. See id. at 313.
73. See John Dvorak, Kansas Approves Death Penalty After 22 Years; Governor Says She Won’t
Fight Law, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), April 9, 1994, at A15.
74. See James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice
Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A1.
75. See Adrian Walker & Doris Sue Wong, No Death Penalty, by One Vote, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
7, 1997, at 1.
76. See generally RADELET ET AL., INNOCENCE, supra note 4, at 282-358; Marty I. Rosenbaum,
Inevitable Error: Wrongful New York State Homicide Convictions, 1965-1988, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 807 (1990-91).
77. See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §§ 650-662 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
78. See Ian Fisher, The 1994 Campaign: Clamor over Death Penalty Dominates Debate on Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1994, at A45.
79. See Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 136, 170 (1964).
80. See Lis Wiehl, A Program for Death-Row Appeals Is Facing Elimination, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1995, at B16.
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Anti-Terrorism and Death Penalty Act signed into law on April 24, 1996. For
example, the Act includes a provision that requires “clear and convincing” evi82
dence of innocence rather than simply evidence of “probable” innocence.
This supersedes the broader standard articulated by the Supreme Court in the
Schlup case discussed above. Under the provisions of this legislation, even with
his videotapes, Schlup would have been executed.
D. General Public
The risk of executing the innocent has turned out to be a rather weak antideath penalty card in the current public debates over the death penalty. In a
1985 Gallup Poll, fifteen percent of those who opposed the death penalty justi83
fied their position by saying “persons may be wrongly convicted.” By 1991,
84
this figure had fallen to eleven percent. Further, the public is increasingly
turning a deaf ear to cases in which death row convicts have made a plea of in85
nocence. Apparently so many inmates and their supporters have claimed innocence, legitimately or not, that officials and the general public dismiss such
claims, including the valid ones, with the cynical reply that abolitionists claim
innocence “all the time.” Thus, it has become clear that abolitionists gain
nothing from inflated claims of innocence; here as elsewhere, crying “Wolf!”
distorts the true situation. There are dozens of cases in which it can be said the
defendant might be innocent, and death penalty opponents are absolutely right
to point that out and stress the risk involved, but journalists and their audiences
appear to tire quickly, signing off on the issue with an attitude that amounts to
a “Ho hum, another ‘innocent’ death row inmate.”
In the end, arguing that the death penalty should be abolished because it
will eventually kill the innocent is not the best kind of argument to make, just
as it is not the best argument against torture to point out that some false confessions will result. Protesting the execution of the innocent does not make one
a death penalty abolitionist; the true test is whether one opposes it for the

81. Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244-2266
(Supp. II 1996)).
82. See Marcia Coyle, Law: Innocent Dead Men Walking?, NAT’L L.J., May 20, 1996, at 1; Ronald
J. Tabak, Habeas Corpus as a Crucial Protector of Constitutional Rights: A Tribute Which May Also Be
a Eulogy, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1477 (1996); Ronald J. Tabak, Panel Discussion: Capital Punishment: Is There Any Habeas Left in This Corpus?, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523, 538 n.119 (1996); Panel
Discussion, Dead Man Walking Without Due Process? A Discussion of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 163 (1997) (remarks of Ronald J.
Tabak, moderator).
83. Alex Gallup & Frank Newport, Death Penalty Support Remains Strong, 309 GALLUP POLL
MONTHLY 40, 42 (June 1991).
84. See id.
85. Among those executed in recent years despite doubts about their guilt are James Adams
(Florida, May 10, 1984), Edward Earl Johnson (Mississippi, May 20, 1987), Jimmy Wingo (Louisiana,
June 16, 1987), Willie Darden (Florida, Mar. 15, 1988), Roger Keith Coleman (Virginia, May 20,
1992), Leonel Herrera (Texas, May 12, 1993), Jesse DeWayne Jacobs (Texas, Jan. 4, 1995), and David
Wayne Spence (Texas, Apr. 3, 1997).
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guilty. The innocence argument is important because it undermines the justification of capital punishment on the ground of retributive justice.
As things stand now, we have little or no knowledge about the effect of information about wrongful convictions of capital defendants on the public’s
support for the death penalty. Here as elsewhere, the Marshall hypothesis
(that the public is ignorant of the basic facts about the death penalty but that if
86
it were informed, there would be a tendency to oppose the death penalty) re87
mains untested in recent years. In the decade since our research on miscarriages of justice in capital cases was first published, we have some vivid anecdotal evidence from various conversations and courtroom testimony showing that
jurors in capital trials who learn about our work find themselves rethinking
88
their support for the death penalty. However, more systematic research is
needed before we can gauge the effect of such knowledge on various constituencies.
It is here that the ABA’s call for a moratorium on death sentencing might
89
have its strongest impact. The ABA’s call has now been joined by a similar
call by the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Associa90
tion, and it is likely that other professional associations in the legal profession
will follow suit. There are also signs that the religious community is increasingly taking a stand against the death penalty; in October 1997, for example,
the twenty-one Catholic Bishops in Texas issued a plea for an end to the death
91
penalty. While such declarations might not turn many of those who strongly
support the death penalty into abolitionists, the call for a moratorium can in92
crease the public’s ambivalence on the topic. This, in turn, promises to lower
the volume on calls for vengeance and to make opposition to the death penalty
in general (by the public) or in a specific case (by a troubled juror) more tolerable, leading to fewer death sentences.
86. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 360-63 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
87. But see Robert M. Bohm, American Death Penalty Opinion: Past, Present, and Future, in
AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 28, at 25, 31-41; Robert M. Bohm
et al., Knowledge and Death Penalty Opinion: A Test of the Marshall Hypothesis, 28 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 360 (1991); Austin Sarat & Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth
Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171.
88. See Michael L. Radelet, Sociologists as Expert Witnesses in Capital Cases: A Case Study, in
EXPERT WITNESSES: CRIMINOLOGISTS IN THE COURTROOM 119, 127-31 (Patrick R. Anderson & L.
Thomas Winfree, Jr., eds., 1987).
89. See generally American Bar Ass’n, supra note 2.
90. See Michael A. Riccardi, Philadelphia Bar Calls for Execution Moratorium, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 1, 1997, at 1. The motion was passed after strong support from Clifford E.
Haines, the former Chief of the Homicide Unit for the Philadelphia prosecutor’s office. See id. Haines
told the Board of Governors about a case in which he had asked for three death sentences, one of
which was ultimately imposed. See id. He later regretted his action because shortly after the death
sentence was imposed, the defense attorney in the case lost his license to practice law because of a
drug conviction. See id.
91. See Cecile S. Holmes, Texas Catholic Bishops Urge End to Death Penalty, HOUS. CHRON., Oct.
21, 1997, at A17.
92. For a discussion of America’s ambivalence about the death penalty, see Franklin E. Zimring,
Ambivalence in State Capital Punishment Policy: An Empirical Sounding, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 729 (1990-91).
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Nonetheless, for the immediate future it appears that most Americans will
either ignore the risk of executing the innocent or simply accept its inevitabil93
ity. A recent letter to the Houston Post by Rex L. Carter is all too typical. In
November 1994, we wrote to the newspaper, pointing out the inevitability of
94
executing the innocent and mentioning the case of Gary Graham. Graham
had admitted to a string of armed robberies but denied he was guilty of the
murder that sent him to Texas’s death row. And, indeed, much of the evidence
95
of his guilt of that crime was suspect. Here is Mr. Carter’s response:
Hugo Bedau had best come in out of the heat. As a defender of the death penalty, I
have no problem in admitting innocent people can be executed and couldn’t care less
what happens to Gary Graham. He should have been executed for what he confessed
to. There is a war going on in our own country—against crime and thugs like Graham. It is sad that innocent people get killed in war, but that is the way it is. Ask any
wartime veteran. Try ‘em, give ‘em 90 days for appeal and then hang ‘em slowly at
noon on the courthouse lawn. Just maybe killers-to-be will get the message, just as
Japan did when we dropped the A-bomb.96

Mr. Carter’s rhetorical flourishes get in the way of his logic, but we have no
doubt his sentiments coincide with the feelings of many citizens.
Dale Volker, the state senator from New York whose ten-year quest to reinstate the death penalty in the Empire State finally succeeded in 1995, had this
to say about executing the innocent: “I would never think it’s impossible. You
would hope that it would never happen, but the mere fact that you might fail
97
does not argue that you shouldn’t do it.”
Or consider the comments of Paul D. Kamenar, executive director of the
Washington Legal Foundation, who early in 1995 was quoted in The New York
Times saying, “I would gladly give them a couple of questionable cases that
they are harping about in return for their agreeing to recognize that in the vast
98
majority of cases, there is no question of the guilt of those being executed.”
This trade we would happily accept; few abolitionists would deny that most of
those now on death row are guilty. We doubt, however, that most retentionists
would be willing to agree that the vast majority of murderers on death row are
not genocidal maniacs, psychopathic serial or multiple murderers, recidivist

93. See Rex L. Carter, Letter to the Editor, HOUSTON POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at C2.
94. See Ex parte Gary Graham, 853 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
95. See Susan Blaustein, The Executioner’s Wrong: Texas Will Execute Gary Graham for a Murder
He Almost Certainly Didn’t Commit, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at C1.
96. Carter, supra note 93.
97. We are reminded of the scene in Dr. Strangelove, in which Joint Chief of Staff Chairman General Buck Turgidson (played by George C. Scott) tells the President (Peter Sellars) that a 40-megaton
nuclear bomb is about to be dropped in error on a target in Russia:
The President: General Turgidson, when you instituted the human reliability tests you assured me there was no possibility of such a thing ever occurring.
General Turgidson: Well, ahh, I don’t think it’s quite fair to condemn the whole program because of a single slipup.
Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (Columbia 1964).
98. See Sam Howe Verhovek, When Justice Shows Its Darker Side, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at
D6.
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killers, and thus that they are not the worst among the bad and so do not belong there.
Finally, consider the comments of Florida State University criminologist
Larry Wollan. Although a supporter of the death penalty, Wollan realizes that
the risk of executing the innocent is undeniable, and he phrases the argument
in a responsible way: “Innocent people have been executed,” he concedes, but
“[t]he value of the death penalty is its rightness vis-á-vis the wrongness of the
crime, and that is so valuable that the possibility of the conviction of the inno99
cent, though rare, has to be accepted.” Elsewhere, Ernest van den Haag made
the same point when he says that our documentation of twenty-three erroneous
executions in this century in America “[does] not tell us anything unex100
pected,” and this liability to grave error does not outweigh the deterrent and
moral benefits of the death penalty. Since, in our judgment, those benefits are
101
entirely illusory —we gain nothing in public safety or moral rectitude by the
practice of the death penalty—the constant and unavoidable risk of executing
the innocent cannot be so complacently tolerated.
V
CONCLUSION
We close on an ironic note. One of the amazing things that has happened in
the decade since our research was first released to the public is that those who
defend the death penalty now concede the inevitability of executing the innocent, even though they challenge individual cases that we and others have identified as probably involving the execution of an innocent person. It is a major
concession. We know of no defender of the death penalty who, prior to 1985,
was willing to make such a public concession. Moreover, this concession has
the effect of forcing responsible defenders of capital punishment to rethink
their argument in two important respects. First, as retributivists, they must acknowledge that convicting and executing the innocent—those who do not deserve to die—is a terrible wrong, and avoiding it is no less important on retributive grounds than convicting and punishing the guilty. Second, they must
explain in convincing detail how a cost/benefit argument, on which they rely,
shows that the benefits from the death penalty outweigh the admitted cost of
executing the innocent. Elsewhere, we have shown why we believe these arguments must fail.102
We are left to ponder how future generations, when they look back, will
evaluate America’s current love for the executioner.
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